# The State of Africa 2010/11

Parameters and Legacies of Governance and Issue Areas

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Korwa G Adar, Monica K Juma and Katabaro N Miti

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CHAPTER 4

Human Security in Africa

Remi Aiyede

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be the most endangered region in the world. This is partly the result of the overall poor performance of African countries in key indices of development and the numerous challenges that threaten its development and stability. A large number of the civil wars in the world after the end of the Cold War occurred in Africa. Many states in the continent appear in the list of failed and failing states. These developments and their devastating consequences tend to cloud the achievements of the continent in economic growth, democratic development and regional integration in the last decade. Indeed, there are serious grounds to worry about the future of the continent, and the capacity of existing organisations and structures to provide a conducive and secure environment for the pursuit of happiness by individual Africans at both national and regional levels.

The complex and diverse threats to the peace, stability and growth of African states and of the individuals that constitute their citizenry have generated concern about human security in Africa. This concern is reflected not only in the attempt by scholars to understand the nature of the security problems besieging Africa, but also in the emergence of several organisations dedicated to practically addressing the elements and factors implicated in the security quagmire. This chapter examines the concept of human security in Africa. It identifies the elements and dimensions of human security. It further traces the trajectories of developments in the essential factors of human security across the continent, paying attention to national, regional and global dimensions. It identifies key issues to be addressed and offers suggestions.

What is human security?

The traditional view of security emphasises military defence. The militaristic conception of national security is often state-centric and concerned largely with protecting the territorial integrity of the state system against internal

violence and external aggression. Owing to its limitation in the face of new threats, recent engagements with the security question have preferred the concept of human security. This is largely a reflection of the immediate post-Cold War world that witnessed a decline in international war and a rise in civil war. Even the rise in civil wars was reversed in the 1990s, recording a dramatic decline in these conflicts.[1] Since 11 September 2001 when terrorists attacked the United States, it has become generally agreed that contemporary threats to national security are no longer located in the context of inter-state relations. Terrorists are not state actors, even though failed or failing states may provide a fertile ground for terrorist activities. The 2002 US National Security Strategy observes that 'poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.'[2] In a similar vein, Cilliers observed that state security, in most of Africa, is not faced by conventional armed attack by other countries, 'but by more insidious measures many of which flow from the very weakness of the state and its absence of control over its territory'.[3]

The concept of human security was first used by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to refer to:

> ... safety for people from the both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition of state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in the perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or government. Like other security concepts – national security, economic security, food security – it is about protection. Human security thus entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerabilities to threats to freedom, safety and livelihoods. It is about minimizing risks and taking remedial action where preventive measures fail.[4]

The Commission on Human Security notes in its maiden report that human security is a concept that combines 'human protection and development and interconnects peace, security and sustainable development'.[5] It emphasised that human security should not focus on macro-state level but also at community and individual level. The Southern African Human Security programme conceives of human security in terms of 'a concern for individual as opposed to state "security". It involves 'a shift away from the kind of thinking that sees security in terms of territorial security or the protection of national interests from internal or external threats.[6] This view follows from that of Mahbub ul-Haq,[7] who sees human security as an alternative to traditional approaches to state security. But this shift appears to be too extreme, for, as Cilliers rightly observed, 'without the provision of national security, neither

citizens nor communities can be personally secure in the broader sense of the term. Without secure and stable countries and a body of practice or law – whereby countries can regulate their interaction – individual, community, regional and international security remains elusive.'[8]

In an age of globalisation, it must be recognised that national security is no longer the preserve of the national state alone. This is not necessarily because the spread of information and communication technology has weakened the capacity of the contemporary state to police its borders. It is rather that globalisation has created a 'risk society' with new structures and mentalities as well as associated security technologies that affect the nature of governance. On the one hand, it has unleashed supranational and trans-national structures outside of the control of national governments, and thereby the character of international relations as expressed in the trans-national processes of regionalisation and civil-society activism. On the other hand, it has affected the very substance of domestic policies and cultures, including the governance of the security sector. Technological and institutional innovations are spreading globally through epistemic communities, knowledge networks and discourse networks, transforming societies, including security technologies as well as the discourse and practices of management and security, from self-protection to the hiring of private armies.[9] What this means is that both national security and the role of the state in it have changed. Thus, the notion of human security which recognises people as being at the centre of the security question advances the integration of approaches among a variety of organisations to provide concrete and sustainable benefits to individuals and communities. Human security challenges in Africa are often traced to internal and external agency and efforts to confront its challenges have come from within and outside the continent. This is to be expected given the reality of globalisation that has so integrated the world that events in one region have practical implications for life and wellbeing in other regions.

One of the most important elements of the human security concept lies in its use to distinguish elite or regime security and the security of citizens in general at the national level. In this sense, it acknowledges the agency of the state or political elites in human security conditions and calls for political responsiveness and responsibility. Hence, participation is highly valued in the discourse on human security. Within this context, the state does not just provide security for individuals and communities as everyone is involved in several protection efforts, from neighbourhood watch to peacebuilding initiatives. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and private organisations also carry out protection activities beyond the state. In the words of Cilliers, 'while the concept of national security largely refers to the security of the state against armed attack or insurrection, the "referent object" of the broader concept of human security – which includes overlapping systems of security at the individual, national and international levels – is the security of the individual in his or her personal surroundings and within the community: the ability thus

of people and communities to pursue a safe livelihood on equal terms with others.[10] The former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, in the 2005 report titled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,* emphasised the point that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent. He underscored the concept of human security in terms of freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. Human security implies that individuals are free from the death sentences of extreme poverty and infectious diseases. It also means that the lives and livelihoods of individuals are not ripped apart by violence and war. Finally, human security implies the responsibility of states and multilateral institutions to protect the rights of the individual, and protect him or her from crime, violence and aggression.[11]

The major limitation of the human security concept is that, for practical and analytical purposes, it is too expansive. For instance, the African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact defines human security as the 'security of the individual in terms of the satisfaction of his or her basic needs. It also includes the creation of the social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his or her full development.'[12] This very broad definition of human security creates a challenge for the monitoring and setting of targets.

In general, there have been no clearly defined indices of human security. It is usually related to such broad concepts as governance, social stability and economic opportunity, and to specific items like hunger, disease (especially HIV/Aids), crime (including transnational crime), armed conflict and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This is because in addition to the point made earlier, the issues implicated in the condition of human security vary from country to country and from one period to another. For the practical purposes of analysis and specific policy measures, each organisation or individual has adopted different approaches. One of the approaches is to select specific dimensions for emphasis in terms of the more fundamental needs of the country under consideration[13] or to locate human security within the context of the role of a responsive state to provide the appropriate environment for equality and individual participation in public decision-making, paying attention to the internal and external constraints to the institutions and processes that enable or make it difficult to achieve a responsive state that effectively plays that role,[14] or identify and focus on key issues in human security such as conflicts, migration, protection and empowerment of the vulnerable, post-conflict reconstruction and governance.[15] In this chapter we adopt the last two methods. In the first instance, we look at the effort to improve the capacity and legitimacy of the state in Africa and then examine some elements of human security, assessing how they play out in Africa. Specifically, this chapter looks at:

- the state and the regionalisation of security;
- conflicts and conflict resolution;
- terrorism, natural resource and superpower intervention;
- safety of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); and
- general welfare and human development.

The state and the regionalisation of security in Africa

Human security problems occur within the context of the state system. The character of the state, its material and historical circumstance and the nature of politics affect how these problems occur and are addressed in terms of policy statements and actions. The state is at the centre of the human security problem in Africa. This is because of the status of the state as the custodian of law and order and the provider of the framework for the pursuit of happiness by individuals and communities. One of the greatest challenges to the state in Africa is its lack of legitimacy as a result of its origin in colonial exploitation and the failure by the post-colonial elite to transform the state into an agent of development and broad welfare.

Post-colonial predation demonstrates the difficulties of transiting from a colonial state to a state embedded in African society. Colonial rule did a lot to consolidate linguistic and cultural differences into the structure of the state. In some countries, like Nigeria, regional cleavages coincide with group or sectional inequalities. These provided fertile ground for political entrepreneurs, who turned regional differences and inequalities to political capital. Thus, the management of diversity has become a major challenge to the effort to improve interaction between state and society. Some states have adopted federalism, transformed the content of citizenship, and democratised in the last decade, but there is still a lot to do to achieve political stability and consolidate democracy in many more states. Mutual distrust in civil society has led to civil strife, and some states, such as Nigeria, are perpetually threatened by outbreaks of violence arising from struggles over distributive resources and political offices. Outbreaks of violence drive from the intense character of political contestation. Political contestation is intense because the state is the chief source of economic advancement in a situation of widespread material poverty. Those who hold political power put in everything to retain it. Those who do not hold political power put in everything to capture it. Politics becomes a zero-sum game, a matter of life and death, as we found in Nigeria, where the 2007 general elections were declared a 'do or die affair' by an incumbent president.[16] In other instances marginalised groups seek to replace the state in a particular region, such as Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and sometimes with severe repercussions arising from the response of those who hold power, as we have seen in the crisis in Darfur since 2003.

The struggle for political power becomes so absorbing that it confounds development. This is the case because as the struggle for power intensifies, the more strategic state-building challenges become relegated to the background. Conflicts thrown up by the politics of survival weaken the state and threaten its very foundation. Thus, fierce and violent contestations lead to bad policies and poor governance, reinforcing developmental failures. Some scholars have questioned the seriousness with which African political elites have approached development, and others have described the type of state craft practised by African patrimonial leaders as responsible for developmental failures. Others have traced the governance crisis and the widespread conflicts to the pre-colonial African societies. Many scholars, however, admit that governance in Africa has over time been affected by colonialism, the Cold War ideological rivalries of the superpowers, the machinations of international financial institutions in the immediate post-Cold War era and the vagaries of contemporary globalisation.[17] One of the effects of the arbitrary character of colonial demarcation of Africa in the post-Cold War era, especially the distribution of particular ethno-linguistic groups across several national borders, has been the externalisation of intra-state conflicts into several countries. Thus, inter-ethnic conflicts in a single country often threaten the stability of an entire subregion, as played out in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region.

African leaders, who for several years have maintained the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), have come to terms with the reality of the contemporary challenge of improving governance and the need to collectively organise security and defence under the African Union (AU). This move occurred at a time when subregional organs, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), had intervened with some success in the civil wars that ravaged their regions. It was also at a time when the UN, overburdened by intractable problems, was embracing the 'Brahimi principle' named after the Algerian diplomat, who in 2000 authored a report proposing that regional organisations take primary responsibility for the problems in their own backyard.[18] After decades of turbulence, there is now a regional consensus to develop both military and non-military mechanisms to deal with governance, economic growth and development and with 'common security threats, which undermine the maintenance and promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent'. The New Partnership for Africa (Nepad) and the Framework for Common African Defence and Security policy represent these efforts to come to terms with developmental slide and to ensure mutual support for progress across the continent under the umbrella of the AU. The protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was adopted in July 2002 with a provision for an African Standby Force (ASF). The force is to be deployed by the

PSC to peacekeeping missions and intervene pursuant to the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act.

Conflicts and conflict resolution

The conflict situation in Africa has not changed significantly over the past few decades. Although some successes have been recorded in conflict resolution in some states, in others, conflicts have deepened and there are fresh outbreaks. Some states, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, which had descended into complete anarchy, are currently under reconstruction with the help of outside intervention.

Liberia held a successful election, recording Africa's first female president. Somalia has proved very difficult and has become a site of operation for pirates. To deal with the situation, warships have been deployed by international coalitions and individual countries to ensure free passage for shipping. The coordination of such deployments, their rules of engagement and the legal environment governing the activities against piracy remain uncertain. The AU peacekeeping force (AMISON), further east of Somalia, has been strengthened. Although the UN-AU hybrid mission in the Darfur region of the Sudan continues to be under stress, an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant of arrest for President Omar al Bashir in early March 2009 provoked the government of the Sudan to revoke the licences of 12 humanitarian aid agencies, including the UK's Oxfam, the Dutch branch of *Sans Frontières Médecins*, and the American-based agency, the International Rescue Committee. Among the vital services that these aid agencies provide are medical care, water, sanitation and education programmes for approximately 650 000 people in Darfur and 1,1 million in northern and eastern Sudan. This action raises grave concerns about the welfare of millions of Sudanese people who rely on humanitarian aid for survival.

In the DRC, stability was established with the intervention of the UN mission known by the French acronym MONUC, and a successful election held in 2006. Violence has been further reduced with the arrest of General Laurent Nkunda of the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP) in late 2008 and the joint operation of Rwanda and DRC forces that severely weakened the *Forces Démocratiques de la Libération de Rwanda* (FDLR) rebels.

There is hope that the economic crisis and humanitarian disaster in Zimbabwe, which deepened with the flawed elections in 2008, will begin to be addressed as a result of the brokered power-sharing arrangement between President Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition party leader, as prime minister.

The outbreak of violence in Kenya following the 2007 elections was resolved in a similar power-sharing arrangement between President Mwai Kibaki and opposition figure, Raila Odinga.

Efforts are underway to return Guinea to constitutional rule following the death of President Lansana Conte and the attendant military coup in December 2008.

In Guinea Bissau, the killing of Chief of Defence Staff, General Tagme Na Wale, and subsequently President Joao Bernado Vieira is being resolved constitutionally with outside intervention.

Meanwhile, the AU has made remarkable progress in developing its military mechanism and structures for the ASF to deal with the ensuing violent and devastating conflicts on the continent. The West ASF of 6 500 soldiers that can deploy rapidly in response to crisis or threats to peace and security in the region was established in 2004.[19] The newly established Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Brigade has expressed readiness to intervene in the DRC and Madagascar in order to restore peace and stability in the two countries currently facing armed conflicts.

One of the contributory factors to the protraction of low-intensity conflicts is the availability and proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the continent. Small arms and light weapons spark, fuel and prolong conflicts, obstruct relief programmes and undermine peace initiatives. They also spread human rights abuses and foster a 'culture of violence'. Although there has been some effort to address these issues, progress has been very slow as a result of the weak capacity of the many states in Africa to police their borders and the lack of cooperation by those in the business of producing and selling arms, both private corporations and wealthy countries, outside of the continent. Another important factor that accounts for the protracted conflicts in Africa is the predominance of economies that are based on export of primary commodities, since such economies conduce to conflict and war.[20]

Terrorism, the scramble for African resources and superpower intervention

One of the defining elements of international intervention in Africa, after the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, is the global war on terror and the renewed scramble for Africa's oil and other mineral resources by the United States, China and other emerging markets. The 2002 US Strategic Policy observed that the United States is now threatened less by conquering states than by ailing ones that provide havens for terrorists.[21] Africa's fragile states are viewed as potential havens for terrorist recruitment and activities. The United States therefore seeks to intervene in Africa's fragile states to help build indigenous capability to secure borders and strengthen law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny terrorists havens. Under George W Bush, Africa's growing oil reserves were declared to be of strategic national interest to the United States because they will become increasingly important in future.

The United States is also concerned about China's increasing involvement in Africa. The United States commenced its military agenda in Africa in 2002 when it set up a military base in Djibouti. Since then, it has contracted military organisations to provide services in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. It has numerous freestanding programmes that supply arms and secure cooperation in locations in Uganda, Kenya and Algeria. It has also signed agreements with Gabon, Ghana, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal and Zambia. It has carried out special programmes, including training in anti-terrorism in Botswana, a cooperation in agreement to enable US military enhancements and training in Botswana and South Africa, a counter-terrorism initiative in the Sahel region, training and weapons-provision in Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. It established the East Africa Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) to carry out military training for security and control of people along the coast of six East African countries, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.[22] In 2007 the Bush Administration announced the establishment of an African Command (AFRICOM), signifying that the 'White House has opted for the hammer' in its dealings with Africa. These have raised fears that such military-based intervention may complicate the ongoing conflicts or generate new ones. If over-militarisation characterises US intervention in Africa, it may detract from the need of building democratic societies and promoting economic development. As foreign aid is increasingly linked to the introduction of new and draconian anti-terrorism measures, a reduced premium is placed on the eradication of poverty and other development goals.[23]

China has in the last decade made major inroads into Africa, with huge investments in oil and other natural resources to feed its rapidly expanding demand for energy and raw materials. It continues to shore up its relations with African countries through the China–Africa Forum. China usually places economic interest above human rights and democratic development and has demonstrated a willingness to deal with dictators. It has provided cover to the government of the Sudan by frustrating the attempt by United States and the UN to intervene decisively in the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Its preference for an enclave working environment in its investment in oil and other mineral resources is poised to be a source of conflicts with local citizens, as shown in Zambia. China is also willing to use political intervention and force to secure its businesses in Africa, as we have seen in its crude intervention in the November 2006 election in Zambia in favour of President Mwanawasa and the use of Chinese police to protect oil pipelines in the Sudan.[24] Thus, just as the Cold War turned the continent into a battleground, there is a danger that Africa may once again be reduced to another front in the War on Terror and United States–China proxy wars.

Safety and security of refugees and internally displaced persons

Safety and security are essential public goods that provide the basis of human security. Indeed, the absence or quality of safety and security defines the status of a state as either weak or failing. Failing states often generate humanitarian needs. This is because dominant state elites are challenged by others through arms, and criminal gangs are able to operate in defiance of the state or the state faces active insurgencies.[25] Securing safety means that the state enjoys some legitimacy, has an effective police force and is able to reduce or prevent crime within it's borders. In the age of globalisation the capacity to ensure safety also involves engagement with other states to fight trans-national crimes, such as smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children, money laundering and international terrorism. Crimes sometimes involve violence that threatens the existence and wellbeing of individuals and has led to forced movement of peoples. Safety and security may also be affected by natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes and accidental bomb explosions. In this case, appropriate agencies must be created for dealing with emergency management. Violent conflicts and other disasters have led to huge problems of refugees and IDPs in Africa. According to the 2008 World Refugee Survey, African hosts some 2 799 500 of the world's total refugee and asylum-seekers, which stood at 14 047 300 at that time.[26]

This state of things owes largely to the series of conflicts that have affected the continent in the last few years in addition to the prolonged conflicts in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Uganda, the DRC and Eritrea, which continue to experience either low- or high-intensity conflicts. In recent times, the escalated civil war in the Sudan, the post-election conflicts in Kenya in 2007 and the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections, have served to worsen Africa's humanitarian situation. In places such as the Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee camps in Kenya and the 12 camps in the Sudan, refugees live in very dire situations. In Kenya the refugees are denied the right to work and live where they choose. The camp is rife with human rights abuses, such as rape, domestic violence and clashes with local populations over resources such as firewood. The same phenomena are rife elsewhere. In the Sudan, the camps lack adequate drinking water and food. Refugees are denied the right to work, leaving them unable to supplement their rations. Refugees and IDPs are often targets of attack to weaken opponents, or recruited to strengthen armed resistance. Madagascar has recently added to the number of refugees and IDPs as a result of the conflict between President Marc Ravalomanana and his rival, the Mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina of the opposition party, after the violence that trailed the public demonstrations that took place in January 2009.

Broad welfare and human development

One of the critical elements of ensuring human security is the empowerment of people and the protection of citizens against harsh economic conditions. Indeed, economic growth has been identified as the key to peace and long-term stability.[28] In the last decade Africa has enjoyed about a 5 per cent growth rate, which has raised hope about the future development prospects of the continent. The rise in the price of oil in the international market was particularly favourable to oil-exporting countries, such as Nigeria, Angola and the Sudan, which have experienced a heady boost in income and foreign investment. The increased incomes have enabled some governments to buy off dissident groups and finance internal security forces. But these have been adversely affected by the global economic meltdown that gripped the world in 2008. It is projected that the global economic crisis will slow the growth rate in Africa from an average of 5 % to 2 per cent. It is expected to slow gross domestic product (GDP) growth and increase the current account deficit for many countries that are net importers of fuel or food. The economic meltdown was also accompanied by a plunge in crude oil prices from US$147 per barrel to less than US$40, causing a major shock for oil-producing countries. The economic meltdown is likely to affect the investment-making capacity of banks and corporations in wealthy countries. Thus, their investments in developing countries might cease, further reducing the growth possibilities of those countries. According to the World Bank's *Global Economic Prospects 2009:*

> Should credit markets fail to respond to the robust policy interventions taken so far, the consequences for developing countries could be very serious. Such a scenario would be characterised by ... substantial disruption and turmoil, including bank failures and currency crises, in a wide range of developing countries. Sharply negative growth in a number of developing countries and all of the attendant repercussions, including increased poverty and unemployment, would be inevitable.[29]

Africa had not begun to address the wide gap between growth and development before the food and economic crisis set in in 2008. A review of the *UNDP Human Development Index 2007/2008* shows that the 22 countries that are characterised with low human development as at 2005 were in sub-Saharan Africa with a human development index (HDI) value of less than 0,5. Average life expectancy for these countries is 54,5, adult literacy 53,9 and GDP per capita (PPP of US$) 14 999.[30] These mean that poverty continues to be a grave issue for these countries and life is generally precarious. While many of these countries already suffer from civil strife or natural disasters and face serious food security challenges, the current situation strengthens the threats from other more disastrous human security factors such as health

and devaluation of human life. Malaria and HIV/Aids remain major health challenges to human capital and account for the low life expectancy in many countries. According to UNAIDS, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest HIV rates in the world. It is estimated that more than 22 million people were killed by Aids in 2007. In countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland more than 20 per cent of adults are infected. In these and many countries, the disease has contributed to the increasing population of orphans, child-headed households and the worsening of poverty.[31] The report highlights that 'to maintain a robust prevention response, countries need to maintain a "prevention movement", build the human and technical capacity that will be needed to sustain prevention efforts, and work to stimulate greater demand for prevention services'. The report also notes that 'in every country where HIV-infection rates have sharply fallen, community mobilization for HIV prevention has been a critical element of success'.[32]

According to the Department of International Development (DFID) on malaria and tuberculosis (TB), Africa accounted for 91 per cent of malaria deaths in 2006. None of the populations of 18 African countries surveyed in 2006 and 2007 had adequate access to anti-malaria drugs, and only 34 per cent of households owned insecticide-treated nets (ITNs). A few countries in Africa – Eritrea, Rwanda and São Tomé and Principe – have been able to cut malaria deaths in half. Of the 647 million people at risk in Africa, the portion covered by ITNs rose from 3 per cent in 2001 to 26 per cent in 2006. Government budgets represent only 18 per cent on average of total malaria funding.[33] Thus, much of the resources for malaria control are increasingly derived largely through the Global Fund to Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM). Of all the TB cases globally, 31 per cent were in Africa, with a declining rate of 46 per cent in 2006. The global average cure rate was 85 per cent in 2006, with the lowest level in Africa at 76 per cent. The incidence of TB has increased with the spread of the HIV/Aids pandemic. This is because people with HIV/Aids are easily infected with TB.

An assessment of Africa's progress towards the achievement of the millennium development goals (MDGs) by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 2008 shows that progress has been slow in achieving a significant number of the targets. North Africa has met the first target to reduce hunger by half in 2015. But many countries along the west coast of the continent are also on course towards achieving this goal. Countries in or just emerging from conflict are worse off. Increased weather variability and climate change have had AN adverse effect on rain-fed agriculture on which many African countries largely depend. The UNECA report also observed that global rising food prices have added to these difficulties. Africa has made some progress in aggregate school enrolment, but school completion rates remain on average at 60 per cent. Eleven countries in Africa achieved gender parity in primary school enrolment in 2005. There is still a significant under-representation of girls at the secondary school level. Child mortality rate is

still very high in Africa. Malaria accounts for the high rates of child mortality in West Africa while HIV/Aids explains the high levels of child mortality in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Although there has been some increase in the population of people with access to clean water and improved sanitation, the rural-urban gap in safe drinking water is still wide and tends to pull down aggregate figures in some countries. Changes in these two areas are too slow to reach the target of MDGs. The report observed that progress is slowest in health-related MDGs.[34]

An International Labour Organisation Report observes that sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand out as regions with extremely harsh labour market conditions and with the highest shares of working poor of all regions. It is estimated that the unemployment rate in Africa stood at 7,9 per cent in 2008.[35] Poor living conditions remain a major threat to human security in the continent. However, it must be noted that the conditions of economies, governance and conflicts vary markedly across countries, hence the need for a collective approach to take advantage of the benefits of regional cooperation.

Conclusion

The capacity of the state to interact with society and extract resources for the benefit of collective interest and the common good is very weak in most of Africa. This is the result of both the colonial origin of the state and the failures of the post-colonial leadership to transform the state and manoeuvre to take advantage of an unfavourable and increasingly globalised world. This weakness of the state in many countries on the continent is reflected in widespread poverty, weak state bureaucracies, fragility of the security sectors, and in the series of challenges to the state's monopoly of the use of force by insurgents and other criminal gangs, and civil wars. These challenges transcend national borders and portend grave danger to the livelihoods of many.

African leaders under the AU have recognised the gravity of the human security challenge in the continent. Unresolved internal economic failures and political instability have, however, made it difficult for them to effectively commit material and human resources to give life to the notion of 'Africans solving African problems'. The achievements of Nepad have been very modest and the AU continues to face severe financial constraints in carrying out peace operations.

The persistence of poor diversity management, as shown in election conflicts, military coups and intra-state violent conflicts, show that there is a lot to be done in ensuring inclusive government and the rule of law. Inclusive government can be achieved when there is responsive and responsible leadership that promotes meaningful participation and empowerment. This means leadership that recognises that political stability cannot be guaranteed by means of force alone. Peacebuilding and conflict-resolution capability must,

therefore, be promoted across the continent and concrete efforts made to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Africa must expend more resources on peacebuilding, peacekeeping and enforcement to reduce conflicts in the short term in order to be able to reduce military expenditure in the long term and free resources for human development programmes.

There is no doubt the current global economic meltdown will adversely affect economic growth and renewed regional and national commitments to good governance and conflict reduction. But this should reinforce the commitment to collective human security. Challenges of human security that relate to nation-building should not be perceived as short-term, quick-fix situations. African leaders must draw on the lessons and pains of the independence struggle, the Cold War and economic reforms as it engages with the superpowers in an effort to promote global security in the 21st century.

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PART 1
Local and National Dimensions