

Civil Society Efficacy, Citizenship and Empowerment in Africa

Emmanuel Remi Aiyede¹

© International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2016

Abstract This paper contributes to the debate on the limited efficacy of civil society in Africa. It examines the complex interface between notions of civil society and citizenship within the context of the postcolonial state in Africa. It argues that the bifurcated character of citizenship is implicated in the inefficacy of civil society. This is underlined by the limited achievements in social citizenship, aggravated by the economic crisis and neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s as well as the politics of regime sustenance. Political disengagement, drain on the moral content of public life and diminished collective orientation of citizens, aggravated conflicts within society, thereby, promoting a democratisation of disempowerment and a disorganised civil society.

Résumé Cet article contribue au débat sur l'efficacité de la société civile en Afrique. Il se penche sur l'interface complexe qui existe entre les notions de société civile et de citoyenneté dans le contexte de l'État postcolonial africain. Il soutient que le caractère bifurqué de la citoyenneté, entre indigène et colon, joue un rôle dans l'inefficacité de la société civile. La citoyenneté n'est pas caractérisée par une conscience d'égalité et d'appartenance collective à une communauté politique au dessein unificateur. Cela est souligné par les réalisations limitées observées dans le domaine de la citoyenneté sociale et aggravé par les crises économiques et les réformes néolibérales des années 80 et 90, ainsi que par les politiques de subsistance de régime. Le désengagement politique, le faible contenu moral de la vie publique et l'effritement de la confiance sociale des citoyens aggravent les conflits au sein de la société, démocratisant ainsi la perte d'autonomie et désorganisant la société civile.

✉ Emmanuel Remi Aiyede
eaiyede@yahoo.com

¹ Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 100005, Oyo State, Nigeria

Zusammenfassung Diese Abhandlung leistet einen Beitrag zur Debatte über die Effizienz der Bürgergesellschaft in Afrika. Sie untersucht die komplexe Verbindung zwischen den Konzepten Bürgergesellschaft und Bürgerschaft im Kontext des postkolonialen Afrikas. Es wird behauptet, dass der zwischen den indigenen Einwohnern und den Siedlern gespaltene Bürgerschaftscharakter mit der Ineffizienz der Bürgergesellschaft in Verbindung steht. Die Bürgerschaft ist nicht durch ein Bewusstsein über Gleichheit und kollektive Zugehörigkeit zu einer politischen Gemeinschaft mit einem vereinigenden Zweck gekennzeichnet. Hervorgehoben wird dies von den begrenzten Erfolgen in der sozialen Bürgerschaft, zu denen erschwerend die Wirtschaftskrise und die neoliberalen Reformen der achtziger und neunziger Jahre sowie die Politik zum Erhalt des Regimes hinzukommen. Politisches Disengagement, schwacher moralischer Inhalt im öffentlichen Leben und ein aufgebrauchtes soziales Vertrauen der Bürger verschärfte die Konflikte innerhalb der Gesellschaft, wodurch die Entmachtung demokratisiert und die Bürgergesellschaft desorganisiert wurden.

Resumen El presente documento contribuye al debate sobre la eficacia de la sociedad civil en África. Examina la compleja interfaz entre nociones de sociedad civil y ciudadanía dentro del contexto del estado poscolonial en África. Argumenta que el carácter bifurcado de la ciudadanía, entre indígena y colonizador, está implicado en la ineficacia de la sociedad civil. La ciudadanía no se caracteriza por una conciencia de igualdad y pertenencia colectiva a una comunidad política con un propósito unificador. Esto queda subrayado por los limitados logros en ciudadanía social, agravados por la crisis económica y las reformas neoliberales de los años 1980 y 1990, así como también por la política de sostenimiento del régimen. La falta de compromiso político, el bajo contenido moral de la vida pública y la sangría en la confianza entre ciudadanos, han agravado los conflictos dentro de la sociedad, democratizando, de este modo, el desempoderamiento y desorganizando la sociedad civil.

Keywords Civil society · Social citizenship · Neoliberal reforms · Indigene vs settler · Empowerment · Africa

Introduction

After several decades of preoccupation with civil society as the major force that propels a country in the transition from dictatorship to democracy, and in the move towards democratic consolidation, experience has demonstrated the limitations of civil society. At first it was Fareed Zakaria (1997) that announced that many new democracies have had elections without cultivating liberal values. Soon, there were cases of democratic reversals and of relapse into dictatorships. Then a series of classificatory schemes across a spectrum between consolidated democracies and persistent dictatorships emerged as scholars endeavoured to make sense of the phenomena that came out of the third wave of democratisation.

In general, while the spread of democracy worldwide has been celebrated there have been concerns about the character of the regimes that lay claim to being democratic. Indeed, Ake (1992) argued that the popularity of democracy has been accompanied by a devaluation of democracy. At the heart of the democratic élan was the proliferation of elections, the singular expression of the arrival of democracy. There was a debate about the sufficiency or insufficiency of elections for determining the democratic character of regimes. Given the importance of elections, attention was paid to the worrisome character of elections in new democracies and how to guarantee the integrity of elections. For it is obvious that where elections have been riddled with irregularities and malpractices, as it is often the case in several African countries, democratic stability is undermined.

Elections became both the pre-occupation of scholars and activists. Election monitoring and observations have become an industry of sorts while efforts are currently invested in studying electoral malpractices and how to check them. Indeed, scholars had focused on the conditions and institutional means of ensuring and securing the integrity of elections. There is yet no robust understanding of how to make citizens and their associations help ensure the integrity of elections, especially in inauspicious situations for democratic stability, such as conditions of widespread illiteracy, poverty and inequality, where there is no middle class large or strong enough to demand voice and participate in decision making processes.

These challenges have brought renewed preoccupation with the character of contemporary citizenship and civil society and their limitations in extending the democratic space and sustaining the vitality of democracy and achieving and sustaining accountable and responsive government. The relationship between the character of contemporary citizenship and its implications for governance (Stoker et al. 2011), and the character of associational life, and the way citizens form and use associations (Skocpol 2003) have become important issues for the contemporary world. The African experience makes the issues more pungent. There has been a long debate about the failure of civil society to live up to expectation. In recent times, the threat of sterility of the debate on the character of civil society in Africa has led to a preoccupation with empirical investigations of what is going on with civil society in Africa (see Obadare 2013; Edwards 2011).

In this essay, I seek to contribute to the debate on the complex problem of achieving democratic stability and vitality by examining the relationship between civil society and citizenship within the framework of empowerment. The argument being proposed is that the character of citizenship is implicated in the efficacy of civil society in Africa, drawing on the Nigerian case. Secondly, it shows that the character of neoliberal reforms, which had deepened inequality and eroded the moral basis of social life, had complicated the problem of unsettled and bifurcated citizenship. Rolling back the state arrested the development of social citizenship in Nigeria. Thirdly, it argues that to strengthen the electoral process as a decision making process by means of civil society, the problematic character of contemporary citizenship should not only be addressed, citizens have to be empowered to strengthen their efficacy and achieve the elements of civil society that conduce to democratic stability and a strong state.

Civil Society and the State

The democratic struggles that characterised the African continent in the 1990s represent an important moment in the evolution of the postcolonial state. The significance of the event is not that it reflects the strains and stresses that accompanied the fiscal crisis of the state, it is rather because it unearthed the contradictions of state-society relations that underlay the fragility of the postcolonial authoritarian state. Given the prominence of professional associations, labour unions, human rights activists, churches and various associations in the unveiling of the contradictions in state-society relations, intellectual engagement with the developments have focused on civil society, a concept that has evolved from the European experience. The emphasis is that citizens press their challenge to autocracy not merely as individuals but as members of an organisation or association. In its more recent application to the democratisation and development processes, it is often linked to the concept of the public sphere and social capital (Edwards 2004).

Within the European context, the concept has undergone several mutations from Hegel to Rousseau and de Tocqueville before it was applied to Africa in the mid-80s. Civil society has been viewed as high society—the ruling groups concerned with the interests of king and country, as undesirable organisational forms that obstructs the relationship between state and citizen, and as a foil against the totalitarian tendencies of the state and thereby a guarantor of individual freedom. But its application to Africa has been drawn from Tocqueville's theory. Here, civil society is conceived as the catalyst of democratisation, pushing it to consolidation and sustaining it (Diamond 1994, 1997; Bratton 1994; Chazan 1994; Woods 1992).

According to Chazan (1996:282), the nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling repeated abuses of state power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens and establishing the foundations for durable democratic government. Diamond (1994) defines the role of civil society as that of “containing the power of democratic governments, checking their potential for abuse and violation of the law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny”. He believes that civil society organisations supplement political parties as schools for leadership training and fostering the development of democratic culture. Citizens learn political advocacy and contestation from participating in such organisations. As avenues for interest aggregation and representation, they serve to mitigate political conflicts (ibid., 7).

The theory of social capital also underscores the importance of civil society to the democratisation process. According to Putnam (1993:90), “participation in civic organisations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours. Moreover, when individuals belong to “cross-cutting” groups with diverse goals and members, their attitudes will tend to moderate as a result of group interaction and cross pressures”. Thus, “a dense network of voluntary associations and citizens’ organisations help to sustain civil society and community relations in a way that generates trust and cooperation between citizens and a high level of civic engagement and participation...creates

conditions for integration and participation”. Civil society as ‘discursive public sphere’ enables citizens to talk about common concerns in conditions of freedom, equality and non-violent interaction (Edwards 2004).

Thus, the revival and vibrancy of associational life generated a lot of optimism about the democratic possibilities in countries of sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere in the world in the 1990s. But with the simmering momentum of democratisation and the sobering outcomes of political reforms in several countries, efforts have been made to explain how and why civil society may contribute or fail to contribute to democratic consolidation and stability in Africa and elsewhere.

Encarnacion (2000:13) has challenged the notion that civil society could serve as the engine of the democratic transformation of formerly authoritarian and totalitarian societies. For him, the idea that strong civil society is a requirement for democratic deepening is empirically flawed. He argues that it is improper to apply a Tocquevillian interpretation that is clearly American in character to developments in most democratising countries. The concept is lifted and applied without contemplating its compatibility with the socio-economic context of most of these transiting countries to which the term is applied. He maintained that in the context of “undeveloped political systems overburdened newly democratic governments and highly politicised populations” a vibrant civil society might supersede the ability of the government to respond to social demand and thus lead to “a crisis of governability and democracy”.

Drawing on contrasting experiences from Brazil and Spain and alluding to other countries in the process of democratisation, he argues that the vibrancy of civil society has not been linked to widespread support for democracy. The proliferation of civil society organisations may in fact be inimical to democratic deepening. In some instances civil society organisations have become alternatives to strong political institutions (political parties) atomising society, dispersing political power and thereby complicating democratic consolidation (Encarnacion 2000).

Studies of several contexts show that civil society may in fact harbour contradictory impulse as a heterogeneous category. It is an arena of conflict between organised interests of various kinds, political disputes among different political projects, and its constituents depend on “political entrepreneurs”, social leaders, or outside allies to represent them or depend on firms, donors and international organisations as sources of funds. These have implications for representation, accountability and the ability of the various groups in civil society to unite in a broad front, which might be critical to propelling democratic change. The construction of democracy involves a complicated processes of state and civil society collaboration, requiring an analyses of the construction of citizenship, re-evaluation of citizenship and subjectivity, state fragmentation, and the position occupied by social actors especially within the context of neoliberal economic reforms (Haque 2008; Aiyede 2005; Bhandari 2006; Avritzer 2008).

The debate over the role of civil society in promoting democracy has been also followed by questions about its role in generating social capital. Social capital is often used as networks that cut across traditional cleavages and which promote trust and reciprocity that nourish wider cooperation, law abidingness and commitment to

the larger political community (Putnam 1993). In the words of Coleman (1990:304), social capital is “embodied in the relations among persons... a group whose members manifest trustworthiness, and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust”. Social capital includes norms of reciprocity and trust available as resources to individuals who interact within a particular group. In this sense, civil society organisation whether, neighbourhood organisations, occupational groups, choral meetings, football clubs, human rights organisations or an ethnic group, or religious communities, by their functioning are capable of generating trust and cooperation which are useful for achieving collective goals.

Civil society needs to simultaneously sustain intimate solidarity within groups as well as sustain connections to the larger political community, to increase the reserve of positive social capital. Fukuyama (1999) talks about the significance of the “radius of trust and Putnam follows Granovetter (1985) in emphasising “weak” ties as against “strong” ties as formative of social capital. Indeed, Woolcock (1998) argues that social capital requires that a balance be struck between “embeddedness” and “autonomy”.

The very assumptions on which the effects of associational life and social capital are based have also been questioned on empirical grounds. Newton (2001) argues that social trust and political trust are not closely associated; both are not strongly associated with membership of voluntary associations in survey research. For him, the relationship between social trust and civil society exist at the system level but in a complicated and indirect manner. The effectiveness of social and political institutions mediates the relationship between individual social trust and political trust. Social and political capital relates to the aggregate properties of societies and polities, not to their individual members. Some scholars have explained the different outcomes associated with civil society and democracy promotion in terms of the political and cultural constraints or pre-existing ethnic and religious cleavages (Sundstrom 2006; Belloni 2008). Jamal (2012) emphasise the inclusivity of political settlement in terms of the extent of participation of major political groups and the degree of societal support.

In an important work on the condition of American democracy, Skocpol (2003:128) argues that democracy has diminished as result of changes in associational life in America. According to her, civic America has transitioned from membership activities to professionally manage institutions and advocacy groups, reflecting adversely on the vitality and prosperity of democracy in America. She therefore argues that while scholars have focused on individual behaviours, and patterns of voter turnout, it is indeed important to study changes in organised public activities and strategic civic leadership. Specifically it is important to study the ways Americans create and use associations (p. 128). Furthermore, she noted that from the 1960s to 1970s massive social movements bypassed federated membership associations and set the stage for the proliferation of new kinds of professionally run civic undertakings (p. 128), diminished the quality of democracy in America as result of the decline of civic involvement by citizens.

Taking the argument forward, Stoker et al. (2011), states that the problem is with our notion of citizenship and how three forces have changed it. The first of these is

globalisation, which has challenged the effective sovereignty of nation states, accompanied by a loss of faith in the capacity of the state to guarantee social and economic well being for citizens, and eroding confidence in representative democracy. The second is regionalisation, which has framed the context of citizenship beyond the nation state. The debate on citizenship “now leaks beyond national boundaries”. The third is that there are ambiguities and contradictions in our experience of the state. The state is no longer able to deliver citizenship in a manner that is considered fair to all. There is a loss of “faith in the capacity of the state to support our citizenship or of citizens to exercise control over the state”. This is seen in growing inequalities, the perceived ascendancy of special interests that have captured the state and the curtailment of freedoms as a result of the fight against terrorism and consequent distrust of public institutions.

There are two traditional conceptions of citizens: the republican and liberal perceptions of membership of a political community with the enjoyment of rights and assumption of duties. The republican model emphasise civic self-rule, active participation in processes of deliberation and decision-making that ensures individuals are citizens, not subjects but political agents. The liberal model emphasise citizen being protected by the law rather than participating in its formulation or execution, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life. But citizens exercise these freedoms primarily in the world of private associations and attachments, rather than in the political domain. These views that combined to constitute the notion of citizenship in western countries were later expanded by the work of Marshall (1950) in which the social dimension of citizens became the catalyst for the welfare state. Thus, to be a citizen of a democracy “meant having access to basic legal rights, political entitlements to vote and make your voice heard, and social rights to basic features of a welfare state”. Stoker et al. (2011) argue that this notion of citizenship has come to grief. Thus, citizenship is the variable that is implicated in the concern about the deterioration in civic activism, and the limits of civil society.

The foregoing discourse shows very clearly the importance of the social foundation of state legitimacy on civil society, thereby rendering citizenship fundamental to civil society. Secondly, it shows that civil society activities change in response to developments within state and society. But most theorising of civil society assumes that citizenship is not problematic. This is not the case for postcolonial states, especially in Africa. Although the issue of citizenship is widely recognised in the literature on political instability and conflict in Africa, the way this problem relates to civil society has not been given sufficient attention. The next section argues that this failure accounts for the claim of the uniqueness of civil society in Africa. Further, studies on the participatory deficits in democracies around the world, especially the effects of globalisation and civil society professionalisation on citizenship in advanced democracies and experiences from non-western nations provide fresh insights that can explain the situation in Africa and the need for addressing citizenship and empowerment.

The Case for the Uniqueness of Civil Society in Africa

In the preceding section I have provided a broad outline of the trend of the global debate on the role of civil society in democracy and development. The essence is to show the global intellectual context under which the specific African discourse should be examined. Second it shows that certain conjectural factors including ideology and character of capitalism impinge on civil society. This is important because of the tendency to attribute exceptionalism to the African situation or to assert, as Osaghae (2006) puts it, the “uniqueness of civil society in Africa”.

To begin, it must be noted that the usefulness of the Tocquevillian approach to actual realities in Africa has been questioned. Kasfir (1998) noted rightly that some of the organisations that have been very crucial to the democratisation process in Africa do not seem to possess the ‘civic/civil’ character that supposedly differentiates civil society organisations from other organisations in society. He argues further that the importance of new civil society organisations to the democratisation project has been exaggerated, and that the conventional view idealises the western practices from which elements of civil society are borrowed. He sees these problems as tied to the prescriptive nature of the definition such that it precludes most of the organisations that have been crucial to the democratic transition process. He therefore calls for the widening of the universe of organisations that can potentially contribute to democracy while recognising the challenges that it poses for state’s effectiveness and capacity to listen, balance and respond to issues. This argument assumes that the western experience is not a subject of debate. It is indeed a subject of contention from the ideological viewpoint and sometimes beyond it.

For Chabal and Daloz (1999), to talk of the existence of civil society in Africa is misnomer because the state in Africa is poorly institutionalised, and weakly autonomous from society. Both state and civil society are integrated in vertical, infra-institutional and patrimonial networks that underpin politics. Social relations is conducted on personalised bonds of mutual beneficial reciprocity while civil society involves the establishment of social networks distinct from the state and capable of transcending primordial family, kin or even communal ties. Only when there is a strong and differentiated state will a counter-hegemonic civil society emerge (Chabal and Daloz 1999:19). Bayart et al. (1999) go further to describe the ways kinship relations have been appropriated to construct a network of criminal activities to take advantage of globalisation and liberalisation as the “maturation of social capital” of the felonious or deceptive state.

On the contrary, Ekeh (1992) argues that if civil society is historicised and contextualised in the light of African experience, using Nigeria as an example, it will immediately be obvious that there is a remarkable number and vitality of free institutions and associations that operate outside state control and that have in several instances posed challenges to the state dating back to the colonial times. The problem with civil society has to do with the social and political space occupied by civil society. According to him, Africa’s political spaces are segmented. The is because of the bifurcation of the public realm as distinct from those of the European

nations where a single public realm effectively offer common platforms for the activities of the state and the public behaviour of individuals. In Africa, this segmentation of public realm limits the potential of civil society as an agent of reform. This segmentation has its origin in colonialism. Drawing on an earlier formulation of this dilemma in relation to the crisis of the state in Africa (Ekeh 1975), he explains that the forces of the colonial state alienated the individual and led to the emergence of two public domains: the primordial public domain, which is the domain of modern social formations associated with ancient structures of Kinship, and the civic public domain, which is the political space within which the formal state operates. Individuals are attached and committed to the primordial public domain against the civic public realm, while the civic realm is illegitimate. Morality holds sway in the primordial public realm, but the civic public realm is amoral. Civil society activities straddle these domains. Thus, the contradictory pulls of the two domains account for the conflictual character of civil society. For Osaghae (2006:244), the ethnicisation of civil society marks the “uniqueness” of Africa’s civil society and Ekeh’s theory of the two publics, expressing the dialectical bifurcation of the public domain provides an explanation for the ineffectiveness of civil society in Africa.

Ekeh (1992) further advances a classification of the vast number of associations on the basis of the context from which they operate; the ends they seek to advance and the sources and means they apply in their operations. Emphasising the primacy of the primordial public sphere, he argues that most associations operating in this domain are unable to foster democratic reform because they are not oriented towards common notions of liberty. Based on kinship, they are unable to transcend ethnic boundaries and crystallise generalised conceptions of the human person and individual liberty. The associations in the civic public domain, such as labour unions, professional associations and human rights groups who may have contributed to individual liberty are weak, though the most exposed. He therefore calls for policies that would reconcile these two public domains, identifying “federal character” or affirmative action as one of such policies.

The weakness of this perspective becomes obvious when it is applied to citizenship. In relations to citizenship, Ekeh (1994:236) contrasts the evolution of the relationship between public finance and citizenship responsibility in the West with that in Africa. According to him, public finance in liberal democratic theory is “conceived and run as [an] aspect of the theory of citizenship and of the public domain. Individuals pay taxes as part of their duties to the state from which they will receive several benefits”. But this does not apply in Africa, where the state is alien and has not been owned by or embedded in society. Hence citizens find it hard to pay taxes and perform duties to the state. What is more, the alien nature of the state coupled with the bifurcated public realm make it legitimate in the eyes of the African to divert resources and funds of the inclusive civic public for the use of the more restricted primordial public by officials whose kinship origins are from smaller enclaves. In other words, the dialectic of the colonial experience has generated a morality that legitimises the use of civic public office and funds for the benefit of the individual or his primordial group. Thus, public officers steal from the civic realm but will not steal from the primordial realm, which remains the preserve of moral

obligations. As I have argued elsewhere (Aiyede 2009), the major weakness of this explanation of the colonial impact is that it fails to reckon with the human agency and policy decisions that establish arrangements within which political interactions occur, or with the evolution of values within society and how these values are sustained or changed over time.

Indeed, it discountenances the moral essence of man and its agency in society. Here we see a contrived moral dilemma when there is none. In the first place individuals that have behaved morally in the primordial public and behave amorally in the civic domain do not constitute the primordial public as moral and the civic public as amoral. Otherwise, it will be equally logical to say that armed robbers, who behave morally when at home with their families and behave amorally when in the site of robbery operations, make the home the domain of morality and the site of robbery the domain of amorality. What is in need of explanation is the inability of the postcolonial leadership to humanise the postcolonial state and transform its workings to serve broad welfare. It is this failure that partly provoked civil society struggles of the 1980s and 1990s.

Furthermore, several arguments have been put forward to challenge the assumptions that underlay the foundations of Ekeh's theory of the two publics (see Osaghae 2006:240). These include the following: bribery and corruption in the civic public has little to do with constitutive primordial interests. If these were so, virtually all hometowns of Nigeria's billionaire current and former military and civilian political leaders would have become model cities and towns. But this is not the case; rather funds looted from public treasury have made their way to individual accounts in foreign banks. Cases of corruption are not confined to state institutions alone. They occur even in religions houses and are reported regularly in Nigerian media. Besides, primordial identities are only one of the multiple identities that individuals adopt, reflecting the heterogeneity of civil society. From this perspective, ethnic and hometown associations are not as strong or deterministic as Ekeh's theory assumes, nor is the implied view that development means "helping your home town" empirically tenable. Indeed, ethnic associations not only perform the function of shadow states, they act as urban-based support organisation for migrants, providing security and avenues for ethno-linguistic identification (Okafor and Honey 1998:12). As Osaghae's (1998) study of Igbos and Yorubas in Kano shows, such organisations are connected to their host government and traditional institutions in a variety of ways. They embark on projects that support their host government and on projects typical of conventional development non-governmental organisations to enhance wellbeing in their places of residence. But Osaghae (2006), does not consider these challenges strong enough to undermine the relevance and timelessness of the theory of the two publics, because of the increased fragility of the African state that followed the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, witnessing the entry of primordial associations as shadow states, providing security for those exiting from the state and the civic public.

As it has been argued elsewhere (Aiyede 2009), drawing on Mamdani's (2001) alternative interpretation of the struggle for independence as a struggle of natives to be recognised as having trans-ethnic identity, to gain admission to a world of rights, and to civil society; it is citizenship that has been reconstituted and bifurcated to

serve predation by the postcolonial leadership manifesting in the indigene/settler dichotomy that confounds the notion of a universal citizenship that upholds equality before the law. Citizenship in this universal sense does not stand in opposition to pluralism, just as multiple identities does not detract from allegiance to the state. Indeed, citizenship in its social dimension is an enhancer of social capital. In the case of the postcolonial state in Africa, the effort at social citizens was never achieved to a significant extent before the onset of the economic crisis of the 1980s. The rolling back of the state under neoliberal programming then deepened inequality such that, as Adejumobi (2001:156) has argued, “citizenship is more nominal than substantive. Thus, “when citizenship rights and benefits are largely denied and the state seems out of reach, pluralism may become subversive of or a danger to the state”.

The notion of indigene/settler, the bifurcated citizenship, has manifested in several ways across the continent, perhaps providing explanation for the different performance of civil society across the continent.

Neoliberal Reforms, Civil Society and Citizen (dis) Empowerment

The decolonization process in Africa carried the promise of development and the improvement of welfare for individuals. State politics in the first two and half decades after independence was defined by an ideology of development. The state did not only control the commanding heights of the economy, it was portrayed as the catalyst and mobiliser of the people, the source of empowerment of citizens. Various countries adopted several strategies of development partly influenced by the ideological preferences of the postcolonial political leadership and local realities in the context of the cold war. Performance of states in Africa in this regard varied across the countries. But as time wore on, the expected benefits of independence did not materialise according to the expectations of many citizens. However, for the elites, occupation of public office provided social and economic security by means of access to the resources of the state. Thus, public office was coveted and competition for public office became the major pre-occupation of the elites. Development objectives were reduced to devices of neutralising or accommodating fractions of the non-ruling elite in the service of regime sustenance by the political leadership. For ordinary people, citizenship gradually lost its meaning and concreteness as authoritarian politics assaulted political rights and economic mismanagement and corruption made the expected benefits of citizens increasingly an abstraction. Most African regimes became so alienated and so violently repressive that their citizens began to see the state and its agents as enemies to be evaded, cheated and defeated if possible, but never as partners. (Ake 1991:13). The situation became worse from the mid-1980s when many states fell into deep economic crisis.

The expected transition from colonial subjects to citizens was never achieved *de jure* neither were the consequences mollified by the achievement of economic prosperity. In fact, the consolidation of single parties, president-for-life, extensive security establishments, widespread inequalities, and personal rule necessarily

involved the denying of the peoples' right to participate in the decision-making process, and sometimes the suspension of the constitution which defined those rights. Hence, Ayoade(1988) described the situation as that of "states without citizens".

The effort to implement economic liberalisation and state retrenchment to address the crisis was met with stiff resistance because they had severe repercussions for well being of the population. But the political leadership had to respond to the demands of its creditors. They had to yield to the prescriptions exhortations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) "to plunge into and persevere in market reforms that were certain to make most people worse off for sometime". (Przeworski 1992:45). These involved the withdrawal of the state from the economy through cuts in subsidies on social services, across-the-board privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises. The adverse effects these had on living conditions of labour, the urban and rural poor provoked the upheavals that eventually engulfed many states. African leaders were urged to become tougher with bureaucrats and social actors who are undermining public policies, more discipline, more probes, more policing. (Bangura 1994:787). Such prescriptions failed to appreciate that people who live and/or work under poor and difficult conditions will sometimes struggle to improve their circumstances in ways that defy established patterns and institutions. In the end, Africa's economic performance fell short of suggested expectations on the basis of market reforms. Many African states lost significant capacity for service delivery and social protection during this period. State legitimacy was eroded even as the struggle over the shrinking resources of the state intensified. Ethnic and other division in society deepened leading to the outbreaks of intergroup violence and civil wars in some states and pressures for political liberalisation and democratisation in others. Civil society organisations proliferated and many dictators were forced to conduct multiparty elections (Osaghae 2007; Carmody 1998; Adekanye 1995; Gibbon et al. 1992). Some successfully retained power as elected civilian heads of state while others were removed from office through the ballot box.

Two effects of neoliberal policies on the state and social conditions in Africa that are very critical for citizenship and civil society in Africa require restating. The first has to do with the promotion of the market as the most efficient allocator of resources and demonization of the state as incapable of inducing the necessary changes in institutions and cultural habits necessary to drive productivity. The second is the idea that the responsibility of the state to cater for basic needs of citizens is not a natural or essential responsibility of the state. The revolutionary effects of these on state-society relations can only be appreciated when it is realised that the opposite of this assumptions formed the basis for mobilising the populace for independence. It marked a reversal of the evolving social citizenship that African states wriggled to achieve with limited results in the immediate post-independence period.

The situation in Africa was viewed beyond the question of the state failing in its responsibilities. The state should not have been responsible for welfare in the first place. This was a prescription for the abrogation of citizens' right to public utilities and welfare. What is more, the cost of health and educational services skyrocketed

as the process of privatisation and commercialisation unfolded, restricting access to these services by large portions of the population. Labour unions and professional associations which strove to protect rights, improve working conditions of their members were defined as obstacles to the functioning of the market (Adesina 1994; Bangura 1994). They became not just opponents of market reforms but targets of state repression. As these groups engage the state, individuals disengaged as the state became more vicious.

Disengagement involved the “withdrawal from social power wherever it is exercised without consent and against one’s best interest”. It involves “an escape from, or at least a mitigation of, unacceptable domination, largely without recourse to violence, and often without the need for organising collective action. Those who disengage do not have within their sights the change of the system or the overthrow of the oppressors; rather they seek a readily available alleviation, or at least a means of protest that is invisible enough to avoid the wrath of authorities” (Baker 1997:54). It is a withdrawal from the state, away from its channels as a hedge against its instability and dwindling resources. Forms of disengagement include moving away from the formal economy into the informal economy. Economic activities turn to outlets outside the purview or control of the state. State laws, ordinances, judicial processes and the judicial system lose their credibility and non-compliance with laws becomes commonplace. Popular religion and a whole array of popular art forms are also important outlets for disengagement. Traditional structures of authority regain force as narrower bases of communal solidarity (village, family, ethnic, religious or other) are reinvigorated leading to greater fragmentation of sub-sectors. In some cases people leave the country in search of greener pastures. The path of disengagement depends on the religion, ethnicity, education or occupation of the people involved (Azarya 1988:7–8).

Just like engagement, disengagement taxes the entrepreneurial ability of individuals with contradictory tendency towards group action. The moral fabric of society comes under severe strains as individual survival strategies trump group solidarity. The drive for income generation supports a new morality of exploiting one’s own group members. In the words of Deb (2009:160), “the adoption of the new economic rationality of pursuit of self-interest conflicts with traditional community interest, which is eventually subjugated by the new forces of the market”. Thus, Claude Ake (1992) writes about the democratisation struggles as an “expression of the will to survive” rather than a conscious effort to open up the political space for liberal democracy. This is because neoliberal reforms hit at the very livelihood of citizens even as the state becomes more rampageous in its oppressive character. Civil society in this context can hardly solidify as it becomes vulnerable to the overarching character of the state as the dominant employer, bearer of opportunities for upward social mobility, and manipulator (Agbaje 1990; Aiyede 2003, 2005).

In addition, the diverse conceptions of civil society and the multiple roles of civil society organisations offer opportunity for the state to appropriate or specify its own conception of civil society, create or support civil society organisations, which it then uses to achieve set objectives. Some members of civil society in Nigeria have been handpicked as representatives of civil society to participate in activities to

address the fallouts of controversial elections such as setting up of the Uwais Commission after the muddled 2007 election or to address national issues as in the 2014 national dialogue set up by the Goodluck Jonathan government. In south Africa, after 1994, thousands of civil society actors “moved out of the sector to participate in parliament, the transformation of state structures and the private sector, taking a great deal of institutional memory and experience with them” (CCSRM 2012:11). Politics in general variously “instrumentalises civil society organisations as protagonists, victims and mediators” (Obadare 2004:5). Atibil (2012) shows how the divergent conceptions of public good, the roles of civil society and the state in the development process by the government and elements of civil society in Ghana reflect in the relations between state and society.

All of these feed on a problematic citizenship in Africa. The origin of the citizenship problem is located in the colonial practice of decentralised despotism, in which peoples are categorised into native and non-natives. Tribe defines the native whereas the non-native is a race. A single law, the civil law, governs all races. Customary law governs the native and there are as many customary laws as there are natives. This system of political control, which is essentially a divide and rule strategy, institutionalises tribal discrimination and justified it as an inevitable consequence of cultural identity (Mamdani 2001, 2012). The transition from the colonial to the postcolonial state involved both a change of guard and a reconfiguration of the colonial strategy of control by the dominant postcolonial elite. In the postcolonial era, society has been dissolved into ethnicities and sustained by a bifurcated citizenship of indigenes and settlers.¹ This practice of citizenship by fragmenting society into antagonistic settler and indigene in relation to the political space, constructs citizenship as an instrument of protection and exclusion. In that context,

the colonial “native” has mutated into a postcolonial “indigene”, appropriating the familiar surroundings of nativity as an instrument of both protection and exclusion in a context in which the postcolonial state has failed to fulfil its original promise or even most basic roles. This is underwritten by the dualism between customary law and statutory law, including a myth of inimitable personal law.... the indigene-settler dichotomy is likely to render any idea of equal citizenship unrealisable with deeply troubling consequences for political stability and the realisation of human rights in Africa. (Odinkalu 2015:99)

The practice of citizenship in Africa, which is characterised by the compromise between the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* approaches, complicated by the identification with indigenous communities or ethnic groups (see Manby 2010), has to a large

¹ An ‘indigene’ is a person tracing patrilocal ancestry through a particular area of the state. This could be a local government, state, province or traditional political domain. A ‘non-indigene’ or settler is anyone resident outside his or her area of patrilocal ancestry. In the case of Nigeria and several other states in Africa such ‘settlers’ or non-indigenes may have lived in an area for a long period of time, even up to five decades, speak the local language, they never become indigenous. Children who are born to such settlers in the location of residency also remain settlers and are subject to a variety of discrimination. If non-indigenes are interested in political or public office they have to return to their state or local government of patrilogy.

extent contributed to the disorganisation of civil society. The practices of citizenship in many spaces is characterised by discrimination in terms of rights to contest for political office, especially at the sub-national level, and access to and competition for the resources of the state, including services, such as admission to higher educational institutions. As many scholars have noted, discriminatory policies have provoked or aggravate inter-communal tensions sometimes leading to violent conflicts in which civil society groups may be implicated (Mamdani 2002; Kraxberger 2005; Human Rights Watch 2006; Hultin 2013). One major implication of the discriminatory practices of bifurcated citizenship is that it drains society of trust, thereby reducing the levels of social capital. Civic organising across spaces becomes a big challenge for civil society actors. In many countries the effort to develop national civil society networks has not been effective. Such movements end up with competing coordinating entities between and within networks for membership, recognition and for taking credit, thereby dissipating energy and resources.

In south Africa, the weakness of civil society is seen in the absence of an effective national federated civic membership organisation able to interact with the state in a manner that can lead to broad positive change. Unlike the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the anti-apartheid struggle, the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOGO) which was formed in 1995 has had limited impact. Although there are new social movements and pressure groups that emerge to address specific issues and lapses of the state, South Africa is still in need of a strong national, membership based coalition to engage in a unified manner with government (CCSRM 2012). In Nigeria, the labour congresses remain the visible national federated organisations with sufficient power to galvanise national action. But the labour federations themselves are unable to sustain action for a meaningful length of time, given their loss of membership under economic crisis, reliance on the large mass of discontent informal sector workforce who work daily to eke out a living and the vulnerability of leadership to co-optation and pressure by government (Aiyede 2010).

In other words, there is a dearth of active citizens engaged in civic organising that cut across the length and breadth of these states. A problematic citizenship, at once dichotomous between indigenes and settlers, and eroded of its social content, renders the evolution of large membership organisations difficult within civil society. Largely dominated by professional non-governmental advocacy organisations, that are not multi-tiered national federations, civil society in many states have not been able to develop effective federated membership associations of mobilised voluntary citizens that connect and network citizens across the country.

To be sure, there is a lot to learn from studies of citizenship as status and as practices carried out in multiple spaces in relation to governance and the empowerment of marginalised groups (Prokhovik 1998; McEwan 2005; Kraxberger 2005). In these wise, the efficacy of civil society requires that citizens “must have access to information around which to mobilize to claim rights, creating spaces of involvement and building capacities for political engagement” (McEwan 2005:987). Citizens must be empowered for effective civic activism as a backbone of civil society. Studies of democratisation have emphasised the role of a strong

middle class in pushing for democracy and the need to reenergise citizens to increase the vitality of democracy (see Norris 2002). The quality of citizenship affects the capacity for agency of individual citizens and local groups to organise and sustain collective action across space and time.

One of the most remarkable expressions of the power of citizens over government in a democracy is the franchise, the power of the electorate, the sovereign people to determine those who can exercise political power. Thus, the capacity of the electorate to freely express their choice in and through elections is central to realisation of a meaningful sense of citizenship.

However, it is rare in many African countries for elections to enjoy broad acceptance of the populace. This is because of the malpractices, irregularities, logistics challenges and other shenanigans that often accompany the conduct of elections. In Nigeria, the outcome of elections is usually challenged and the process questioned by opposition parties and citizens. Virtually all elections at the gubernatorial and presidential levels have been challenged in court since 1999. In some African states like Kenya and Zimbabwe the onset of elections is usually characterised by trepidation owing to spectre of violence. Thus, there is a question of whether citizens make effective choices when they vote. Claude Ake (1994) in a very interesting examination of the elections in Nigeria, described the process as the “democratisation of disempowerment”, a process where people vote without choosing, because their choice is limited to a choice between two or more oppressors. Adebani and Obadare (2010) described the situation as the abrogation of the electorate.

This situation has to change for the health of democracy in Africa. It must be recognised that democratic struggles are presently as much about citizenship and quality of life issues as they are about restraining the state and securing civil and political rights. There is therefore a need to empower citizens by reasserting the role of the state in promoting social citizenship away from the neoliberal view that has democratised disempowerment. Empowerment is about education for active citizenship, learning about ‘who has power and about how power can be taken, who is excluded and why and how this can be challenged’ (Mayo and Anastacio 1999:14–15). Andersen and Sim (2004) define empowerment as the process of awareness and capacity building, which increases the participation and decision making of citizens to a transformative action, which will change opportunity structures in an inclusive and equalising direction. Thus, Tam (2007) proposed three challenges to address the citizenship question in relation to empowerment: recovering the progressive ethos of empowerment, re-orientating public institutions towards empowerment and strengthening our civic infrastructure.

Conclusion

Popular struggles since the 1980s are a struggle to make citizenship meaningful and concrete. This processes needs to be accelerated not only by individual agency, this is certainly important given the role of strategic leadership, but more importantly at the level of civil society organisational agency. Civil society must be involved in

creating citizens who are engaged in several publics. The real problem for civil society is not a bifurcated social space however construed but the existence of a bifurcated citizenship, in a context of multiple publics. The bifurcated citizenship divorces citizens' obligations from duties. It creates representation without taxation and taxation without representation fuelling suspicion and distrust, disorganising civil society. The implications of the indigene/settler divide for citizenship has been illustrated in a variety of contexts in the literature (see Mamdani 2001; Adejumo 2001; Aiyede 2009). It undermines the moral fabric of the public sphere by making the equality of citizens mute and thereby constituting the state system as unjust and discriminatory. The resolution of the citizenship question by de-emphasising ancestry and privileging residency is necessary to building state and civil society in Africa. Such a reconstructed citizenship can rejuvenate the moral fabric of civil society. It will be the basis for the emergence of mass society and facilitate the solidification of civil society, in the de Tocquevillian sense, with cross cutting networks, able to sustain action against state excesses and accumulate social capital that will serve as a hedge against predatory rule.

In Nigeria, several organisations in civil society such as the Citizen's forum for Constitutional Reform have been pushing for the redefinition of sub-national citizenship with an emphasis on residency rights (Kraxberger 2005:21). Its achievement will be a major step in neutralising the frayed link among citizens at the grassroots. It holds the potential of unleashing a sense of political community at the sub-national level that can increase the stake with the postcolonial state and enhance the membership of associations and their capacity to engage the state. In addition, citizens' capacity to make effective decision and participate in public life must be built. This will require African governments to carry out programmes that improve the quality of life of the poor and disempowered.

References

- Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2010). The abrogation of the electorate: An emergent African phenomenon. *Democratization*, 18(2), 311–335.
- Adejumo, S. (2001). Citizenship, rights, and the problem of conflicts and civil wars in Africa. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23(1), 148–170.
- Adekanye, A. (1995). Structural adjustment, democratisation and rising ethnic tension in Africa. *Development and Change*, 26(2), 355–374.
- Adesina, Jimi. (1994). *Labour in the explanation of an African crisis*. Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Agbaje, A. (1990). In search of the building blocks: The state, civil society, voluntary action and grassroots development in Africa. *Africa Quarterly*, 30, 34–40.
- Aiyede, E. R. (2003). The dynamics of civil society and the democratisation process in Nigeria. *Canadian Journal of African studies*, 37(1), 1–27.
- Aiyede, E. R. (2005). Leadership and the pro-democracy movement in Nigeria. In O. Adebayo, A. Agbaje, H. Abdullah, & C. Obi (Eds.), *Beyond the state: Nigeria's search for positive leadership* (pp. 229–315). Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Aiyede, E. R. (2009). The political economy of fiscal federalism and the dilemma of constructing a developmental state in Nigeria. *International Political Science Review*, 30(3), 249–269.
- Aiyede, E. R. (2010). From corporatist power to abjection: Labour and state control in Nigeria. In W. Adebanwi & E. Obadare (Eds.), *Encountering the Nigerian state* (pp. 177–197). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Ake, C. (1991). As Africa democratises. *Africa Forum*, 1(2), 13–18.
- Ake, C. (1992). Devaluing democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 3(3), 32–36.
- Ake, C. (1994). *Democratisation of disempowerment*. Malthouse Monograph Series: Lagos.
- Andersen, J., & Siim, B. (2004). Introduction: The politics of inclusion and empowerment—gender, class and citizenship. In J. Andersen & S. Birte (Eds.), *The politics of inclusion and empowerment gender, class and citizenship*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Atibil, C. (2012). Governance and actors' conceptualisation of "Civil Society" in Africa: State-civil society relations in Ghana from 1982–2000. *Voluntas*, 23, 43–62.
- Avritzer, L. (2008). Democratisation and citizenship in latin America: The emergence of institutional forms of participation. *Latin America Research Review*, 43(2), 282–289.
- Ayoade, J. (1988). States without citizens: An emerging African phenomenon. In D. Rotchild & N. Chazan (Eds.), *The precarious balance: State and society in Africa* (pp. 21–29). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Azarya, V. (1988). Reordering state-society relations: Incorporation and disengagement. In Donald Rotchild & Naomi Chazan (Eds.), *The precarious balance: State and society in Africa* (pp. 3–20). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Baker, B. (1997). Beyond the long arms of the law: The pattern of political disengagement in Africa. *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, 53–74.
- Bangura, Y. (1994). Economic restructuring coping strategies and social change. *Development and Change*, 25(4), 785–827.
- Bayart, J. (1999). The social capital of the Felonious state or the ruses of political intelligence. In J. Bayart, S. Ellis, & B. Hibou (Eds.), *The Criminalisation of the state in Africa* (pp. 32–48). Oxford: James Currey.
- Belloni, R. (2008). Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (Eds.), *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding* (pp. 182–210). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bhandari, V. (2006). Civil society and the predicament of multiple publics. *Comparative Studies of South Asia Africa and the Middle East*, 26(1), 36–50.
- Bratton, M. (1994). Civil, society and political transitions in Africa. In J. W. Harbeson, D. Rotchild, & N. Chazan (Eds.), *Civil society and the state in Africa*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO.
- Carmody, P. (1998). Constructing alternatives to structural adjustment in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 25(75), 25–46.
- Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. (1999). *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Chazan, N. (1994). Engaging the state: Associational life in Sub-Saharan Africa. In A. Kohli, J. Migdal & V. Shue (Eds.), *The State in Society* (pp. 255–289). London: Cambridge University Press.
- Chazan, N. (1996). Africa's democratic challenge. *World Pol J*, 9(2), 279–307.
- Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilisation (CCSRM). (2012). *Critical perspectives on sustainability of the South African civil society sector*. Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd: Auckland Park.
- Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Deb, D. (2009). *Beyond developmentalism: Constructing inclusive freedom and sustainability*. London: Earthscan.
- Diamond, L. (1994). Rethinking civil society: Toward democratic consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), 4–17.
- Diamond, L. (1997). Introduction: In search of consolidation, in diamond. In M. F. Plattner, Y.-H. Chu, & H. Tien (Eds.), *Consolidating the third wave democracies: Themes and perspectives*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Edwards, M. (2004). *Civil Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Edwards, M. (Ed.). (2011). *The oxford hand book of civil society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ekeh, P. P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17(1), 91–112.
- Ekeh, P. P. (1992). The constitution of civil society in African history and politics. In B. Caron, E. Gboyege, & E. Osaghae (Eds.), *Democratic transition in Africa* (pp. 83–104). Ibadan: University of Ibadan.
- Ekeh, P. P. (1994). The public realm and public finance in Africa. In U. Himmelstrand, K. Kinyanjui, & E. Mburugu (Eds.), *African perspectives on development: Controversies, dilemmas and openings* (pp. 234–258). London: James Currey.
- Encarnacion, O. G. (2000). Tocqueville's missionaries: Civil society, advocacy and the promotion of democracy. *World Policy Journal*, 17(1), 9–18.

- Fukuyama, F. (1999). *Social capital and civil society*. In: Paper Prepared for the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms.
- Gibbon, P., Bangura, Y., & Ofstad, A. (1992). *Authoritarianism, democracy and adjustment in the politics of economic reform in Africa*. Uppsala: Nodiska Afrikanistitutet.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), 481–510.
- Haque, M. S. (2008). Global rise of neoliberal state and its impact on citizenship: Experiences in developing nations. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 36, 11–34.
- Hultin, N. (2013). Civil society and conflict in West Africa. In E. Obadare (Ed.), *The handbook of civil society in Africa* (pp. 199–212). New York: Springer.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2006). *They do not own this place: Government discrimination against non-indigenes in Nigeria*. New York: HRW.
- Jamal, M. A. (2012). Democracy promotion, civil society building, and the primacy of politics. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(1), 3–31.
- Kasfir, N. (1998). Civil society, the state and democracy in Africa. In Nelson Kafir (Ed.), *Civil society and democracy in Africa: Critical perspectives* (pp. 123–149). London: Frank Cass.
- Kraxberger, B. (2005). Strangers, indigenes and settlers: Contested geographies of citizenship in Nigeria. *Space and Polity*, 9(1), 9–27.
- Mamdani, M. (2001). Beyond the settler and native as political identities: Overcoming the political legacy of colonialism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 43(4), 651–664.
- Mamdani, M. (2002). African states, citizenship and war: A case study. *International Affairs*, 78(3), 493–506.
- Mamdani, M. (2012). *Define and rule: Native as political identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Manby, B. (2010). *Citizenship law in Africa: A comparative study*. New York: Open Society Institute.
- Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and social class and other essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mayo, M., & Anastacio, J. (1999). Welfare models and approaches to empowerment. *Policy Studies*, 20(1), 5–21.
- McEwan, C. (2005). New spaces of citizenship? Rethinking gendered participation and empowerment in South Africa. *Political Geography*, 24, 969–991.
- Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital and civil society, and democracy. *International Political Science Review*, 22(2), 201–214.
- Norris, P. (2002). *Reinventing the Phoenix*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Obadare, E. (2004). Obstacle, bridge or promised land? The role of civil society in the challenges confronting Africa, Report of the International Society for Third Sector Research third Africa Regional Conference, Cotonou, Benin Republic May 7–10. ISTR Report.
- Obadare, E. (Ed.). (2013). *The handbook of civil society in Africa*. New York: Springer.
- Odinkalu, C. A. (2015). Natives, subjects, and wannabes: Internal citizenship problems in postcolonial Nigeria. In R. E. Howard-Hassmann & M. Walton-Roberts (Eds.), *The human right to citizenship: A slippery concept* (pp. 97–114). University of Pennsylvania Press: Pennsylvania.
- Okafor, S. I., & Honey, R. (1998). The nature of hometown voluntary associations in Nigeria. In R. Honey & S. I. Okafor (Eds.), *Home town associations: Indigenous knowledge and development in Nigeria* (pp. 9–16). London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Osaghae, E. E. (1998). Hometown associations as shadow states: The case of the Igbos and Yorubas in Kano. In R. Honey & S. I. Okafor (Eds.), *Home town associations: Indigenous knowledge and development in Nigeria* (pp. 111–121). London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Osaghae, E. E. (2006). Colonialism and civil society in Africa: The perspective of Ekeh's two publics. *Voluntas*, 17, 233–245.
- Osaghae, E. E. (2007). Fragile states. *Development in Practice*, 17(4&5), 691–699.
- Prokhovik, R. (1998). Public and private citizenship: From gender invisibility to gender inclusiveness. *Feminist Review*, 60, 84–104.
- Przeworski, A. (1992). The neo-liberally fallacy. *Journal of Democracy*, 3(3), 45–59.
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Skocpol, T. (2003). *Diminished democracy: From membership to management in American civic life*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

-
- Stoker, G., Armstrong, C., Banya, M., McGhee, D., McGrew, A., Mason, A., et al. (2011). *Prospect for citizenship*. Southampton: Bloomsbury Academic for Centre for Citizenship, Globalization and Governance University of Southampton.
- Sundstrom, L. M. (2006). *Funding civil society: Foreign assistance and NGO development in Russia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Tam, H. (2007). Civil renewal: The agenda for empowering citizens. In T. Brannan, P. John, & G. Stoker (Eds.), *Re-energizing citizenship strategies for civil renewal* (pp. 26–40). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Woods, D. (1992). Civil society in Europe and Africa: Limiting state power through a public sphere. *African Studies Review*, 35(2), 77–100.
- Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Towards a theoretical synthesis and policy framework. *Theory and Society*, 27(2), 151–208.
- Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76, 28–45.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY